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THROUGH THE EYES OF THE DEBTOR: Mississippi REEXAMINES
THE BREACH OF THE PEACE EXCEPTION TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SECTION 9-503
Ivy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
612 So. 2d 1108 (Miss. 1992)
Stephen M. Cozart
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-help repossession is the keystone on which our consumer economy rests.
By allowing an inexpensive' method of recovering a security interest, this ancient
right makes credit purchases possible while protecting both the creditor and the
debtor.2 Section 9-5031 of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.]
dictates that the only restriction on the right of self-help repossession is that it must
be effected without breach of the peace.4 The authors of the U. C. C. did not rede-
finebreach of the peace, but rather used this time-honored term in order to facili-
tate the continuation of principles that have governed self-help repossessions since
the middle ages.'
In Ivy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 6the Mississippi Supreme Court fur-
ther defined the boundaries of the breach of the peace exception, but this newest
development has not served to clarify the law; it has served to confuse the law.
Mississippi's pre-Ivy jurisprudence in the area of breach of the peace, while lim-
ited, did present a balanced and well-reasoned definition of breach of the peace. In
Ivy, however, the court failed to address the issues of when breach of the peace is
related to the repossession and the creditor's reasonable notice of protest. By ne-
glecting to address these key issues in the breach of the peace equation, the court
1. Inexpensive, of course, is a relative term. In this context, it means that self-help repossession does not
entail the hidden costs of an action for replevin. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. See generally
James J. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503.
2. Eugene Mikolajczyk, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A Modem
Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REv. 351, 352 (1978).
3. Codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-9-503 (1981). This section provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a
secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action." Id.
4. Mikolajczyk, supra note 2, at 352.
5. Mikolajczyk, supra note 2, at 354-55. Self-help repossessions were originally tolerated by a justice sys-
tem that was too weak and ineffectual to control the human impulse of resorting to self-help measures. By 1066,
however, with the growth and development of an effective judiciary, self-help had been completely outlawed.
Interest was not rekindled in self-help until the feudal system provided a need for the lord of the estate to protect
his property. The remedy was not absolute, even for the lord, because the courts realized that the protection of
the public peace was also an important concern. Mikolajczyk, supra note 2, at 352-53. This realization led to the
breach of the peace exception which still serves this same purpose today.
For a complete historical review of the right to self-help repossession, see Mikolajczyk, supra note 2, at 352-
53.
6. 612 So. 2d 1108 (Miss. 1992).
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created an anomaly in the law that not only circumvents the purpose of the breach
of the peace exception to self-help repossession, but also conflicts with other areas
of the law.
II. FACTS
In March 1988, Lester Ivy fell two-and-a-half months behind on the payments
for his Chevrolet van. 7 After several contacts, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation [hereinafter GMAC] determined that the delinquent payments were
not forthcoming, 8 and employed American Lenders Service Corporation to repos-
sess the van.9 In order to carry out the repossession without a breach of the peace,
representatives of American Lenders Service Corporation entered the Ivys' prop-
erty at 6:30 a. m.'0 The representatives, Dax Freeman and Jonathan Baker, drove
up Mr. Ivy's quarter-mile driveway and located the van, which was parked near
the home.11 Without contacting the Ivys,12 they attempted to start the van with a
set of keys, but were unable to do so. 13 Freeman and Baker then connected the van
to their tow truck and began to tow it away.
14
Freeman and Baker towed the van to the end of the driveway, where they
stopped for Baker to check the alignment of the van's wheels. 1" While stopped,
they noticed someone running away from them, but since they could not identify
the person they thought that they had successfully completed the repossession.1
Thus, Freeman and Baker left rapidly and turned onto a small dirt road known as
the Chain Road.17 At the Chain Road's dead end, they turned onto Highway
Thirty-Five, and soon thereafter Mr. Ivy passed them in his pick-up truck.18 After
he passed the tow truck he "slammed on his brakes" in front of it, and there was a
slight collision.19
7. Brief for Appellant at 2, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359).
8. GMAC first contacted the Ivys and inquired about the late payments. Brief for Defendant/Appellee/
Cross-Appellants at 4, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. The Ivys mailed a check, and it
was returned as an overdraft. Id. After several unanswered calls, the Ivys agreed to catch up the payments, but no
payments were received. Id. On the next call, Mrs. Ivy hung up on the GMAC representative. Id. Partial pay-
ment was then received, but again, it was returned as an overdraft. Id. At this point the Ivys were $931.12 past
due on their payments, and the decision was made to repossess the van. Id. at 5. Mr. Ivy claimed that his wife
handled the finances, and that he was thus unaware of the fact that the payments were past due. Id.
9. Id.
10. Ivy, 612 So. 2d at 1109.
11. Id.
12. Brief for Appellee at 3, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359).
13. Ivy, 612 So. 2d at 1109. The record does not indicate from where the keys were procured. Id. at n.2.
14. Id. at 1110.
15. Brief for Appellee at 3, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359).
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id. at 3. Freeman and Baker intended to proceed to the nearest pay phone in order to call the sheriff's
department and report the repossession. Id.
18. Ivy v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Miss. 1992).
19. Id. The collision was so slight that Ivy's personal injury amounted to only $20.00 in medical bills. Id.
After the collision, Freeman showed Ivy some " ' official-looking' documents which seemed to validate the repos-
session." Id. Freeman then allowed Ivy to retrieve his personal belongings from the van, and provided him a
number to call if he wanted to "get his van back." Id. It is uncontested that this exchange was cordial, and after-
ward all of the participants peacefully left the scene. Id.
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Ivy then brought this action seeking to have the repossession declared void un-
der U. C. C. section 9-503, because the representatives had caused a breach of the
peace.2" He sought damages for injuries he sustained in the collision and punitive
damages for the willful and wanton disregard for the law.21 The trial court found
that a breach of the peace had occurred and awarded damages; however, it denied
Ivy's demand for punitive damages. 22
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Mississippi Law on the Breach of the Peace Exception
1. State Court Decisions
Even before the U.C.C., a creditor was allowed to repossess a chattel using
self-help methods, as long as this could be done without a breach of the peace.2
The Mississippi Supreme Court first addressed the issue of breach of the peace in
Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence.24 In Spence, the plaintiff had already defaulted
on his car loan when he and his wife took a trip out of town and parked the car
overnight in a hotel lot.2" The creditor sent one of its employees to the hotel to col-
lect the final installment payment, but when the representative was unable to find
Mr. Spence, he decided to repossess the car.26 Finding the car locked, the repre-
sentative broke one of the windows and took the car to a storage room.27
The court, relying on the legal reasoning of the Alabama Supreme Court,28
stated that "the right to take the property from the possession of the other party
does not justify the use of force to take it,- it must be done without force or vio-
lence, and if possession cannot be so obtained, then resort must be had to the proc-
esses of the courts. 29 The court determined that breaking the window was an act
of force." Thus, because the representative had used force to effect the reposses-




23. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27-6, at 575 (3d ed. 1988).




28. See Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Hayes, 114 So. 420 (Ala. Ct. App. 1927). In Hayes, there was a claim for
wrongful breaking and entering of the plaintiffs home to repossess a sewing machine. Id. at 420. The Alabama
court determined that once the plaintiff was in default, she no longer had a right of possession in the chattel, and
therefore the owner, the defendant company, had the right to take possession at any time or place. Id. at 421. The
only restriction placed on the defendant was that possession could be retaken only if it could be done without
committing "trespass, violence, force, or breach of the peace."Id. The court determined that the creditor did not
"have the right to break into and enter plaintiffs residence in the manner alleged." Id. Thus, the repossession was
invalid. Id.
29. Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 184 So. 439, 441 (Miss. 1938).
30. Id. at 441-42.
31. Id. at 442.
1994l
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In discussing the public policy aspects of the ruling, the court stated that vio-
lence or force could not be used to enforce a contract by repossessing a secured
chattel." The court commented that most people yield peaceable obedience to
their contractual obligations, and to allow creditors to be their ownjudges of when
the contract must be enforced, regardless of the method, "would be contrary to
good order [and] would be provocative of retaliatory violence and breaches of the
peace; wherefore, as a matter of public policy, no such right can exist."33
The Mississippi court next considered a breach of the peace issue in
Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain." In Cain, the plaintiff had let her husband take
her car into Clarksdale, Mississippi, where he parked the car on the side of a pub-
lic street.3" The creditor repossessed the car,36 at which point the husband objected
to the taking, but his objection did not result in any violence. 7 Cain claimed that
unless the car "was surrendered voluntarily, the [creditor's] action. . in taking it
was an oppressive tort."38
The court referred to the limitations announced in Spence to determine that the
repossession was lawful." The court held that there is no breach of the peace
when a debtor simply withholds his consent to the taking.4" The court stated that
the repossession is lawful so long as it is done "at a proper place, and without force
or violence or any threat thereof, and when the circumstances are such as to create
no apprehension of any violence on the part of the mortgagor, or other person from
whom the possession is being taken."41 The court acknowledged that the creditor
could not continue the repossession in the face of a breach of the peace, and it de-
termined that a breach of the peace means the eruption of violence or the immi-
nent threat of future violence.42 Thus, because Cain's objection had not created
violence or the apprehension of violence, there was no breach of the peace, and
the repossession was valid.'
In discussing the public policy aspects of the Cain ruling, the court rejected the
proposition that in order to maintain the peace it is necessary that self-help not be
utilized without the consent of the mortgagor." The court acknowledged that it
would be preferable to resort to the court action of replevin if there was a chance
that the mortgagor would not consent to the repossession, but it also recognized
32. Id. at 441.
33. Id. at 441-42.
34. 1 So. 2d 776 (Miss. 1941).
35. Id. at 776.
36. It is not clear that repossession was justified by the situation. The first payment was not yet due, but the
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that a resort to the courts was not without significant costs.4 After weighing the
options, the court stated that the breach of the peace exception had been "cut down
• . . as much as the law. . . will allow, and. . . [the court] cannot impose further
limitations upon it" by requiring that the creditor resort to the courts if there is the
slightest danger of a breach of the peace.46
The court's next ruling in this area came in Furches Motor Co. v. Anderson.47 In
Anderson, the secured creditor repossessed a car from the parking area of a car
dealership.' An employee of an unnamed company was to service the car and then
park it at a car dealership for the plaintiff, Mr. Anderson, to pick up.49 Mr.
Anderson did not witness the repossession, and the employee who parked the car
did not protest it. 5"
In determining that this was a lawful repossession, the court applied the Cain
rule which held that consent is not required if the taking can be done without vio-
lence.51 The court ruled that this repossession was "peaceable and without any
force or violence in the exercise of a power granted under the contract. The facts
that it was at night and that. . . the car was located on the premises of [a car deal-
ership did] not negat[e] that conclusion."52
The court has also determined that a creditor is not permitted to forcibly enter a
debtor's dwelling to repossess a chattel. 3 In Kirkwood v. Hickman, the defendant
held a security interest in a stove for repayment of a note on which the plaintiff had
defaulted.55 In that case, the defendant went to the plaintiff's home where the stove
was kept and attempted to enter the premises." The plaintiff was out of the state at
the time, but her daughter-in-law was there and objected to the repossession.5 7
Over the daughter-in-law's objections, the defendant entered the home and took
the stove.5 8 Upon entry, she made no effort to stop them because, as she testified,
"[T]here wasn't anything I could do, they were bigger than I was."
59
In determining that the creditor did not have the right to enter the premises
without permission, the court applied the rule that a creditor may not enter
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 61 So. 2d 674 (Miss. 1952).
48. Id. at 677. It was disputed whether the car was on the property of Lee Motor Company. For the purpose of
the opinion, the court assumed that it was. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 680.
52. Id.
53. Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1955).
54. Id.




59. Id. at 353.
1994]
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another's property to recover a chattel.6" The court ruled that because the security
agreement did not contain an expressly-worded clause allowing entry onto the
premises of the mortgagor, and the daughter-in-law's objection to the repossession
evoked a threat of violence, the creditor had breached the peace which thus termi-
nated his right to repossession.61 Since the creditor no longer had the right to take
possession of the stove, he had no right to enter the home; therefore his actions
amounted to a trespass and, hence, a breach of the peace.62
In Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp. , the court heard a slightly different
variation on breach of the peace. In Bradley, the court determined that it was per-
missible to use fraud to repossess an automobile.64 There the plaintiff, Bradley,
took his car to a mechanic who worked out of his own yard.6" Bradley agreed to
pay the mechanic for the repairs at a later date, but before he could do so, the rep-
resentatives of the defendant discovered the location of the car and went to the me-
chanic in order to repossess it. 66 The representatives falsely told the mechanic that
Bradley was bankrupt so that he would release the car to them.67 The mechanic
complied, and after Bradley learned of the repossession he filed an action."
The court determined that this repossession did not breach the peace and was
therefore valid.69 In announcing the decision, the court did not give any legal prec-
edent, but in referring to other cases stated that the underlying theme was the pre-
vention of violence; thus, since "[i]t [was] not claimed that force was used to
obtain possession of the automobile in this case. . . and [since the court thought
that] the evidence was insufficient to show 'malice, fraud, oppression or wilful
wrong,"' the repossession was permissible.70
The court next reviewed Dearman v. Williams.7 There the defendant sent its
representatives to the home of the plaintiff to repossess an automobile.72 They
were greeted by the plaintiffs young son,73 who told them that his father was at
work.74 The representatives told the boy that they were going to look at the car, but
60. Wilson v. Kuykendall, 73 So. 344, 344 (Miss. 1917). In Wilson, the defendant entered the premises of the
plaintiff to recover a mule that he had sold to the plaintiff, but on which the note had never been delivered. Id. In
concluding that the entry was unlawful, the court stated that "a party has not the right to invade the premises of
another and take. . . any property, even though he may have title thereto." Id.
61. Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d 351, 356 (Miss. 1955).
62. Id. However, it is important to note that the court's ruling was only applicable to an instance where a con-
tract did not specifically provide a right to enter the premises far the purpose of effecting a repossession. Id.
63. 92 So. 2d468 (Miss. 1957).





69. Id. at 471.
70. Id. at 472.
71. 109 So. 2d 316 (Miss. 1959).
72. Id. at 319.
73. The court stated that he was "eleven or twelve year[s] old." Id.
74. Id. The father was actually in court in Quitman, Mississippi. Id. Apparently, the boy was unaware of this
fact. Id.
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when they found that the car was unlocked and that the keys were in it, they told
the boy that it "looked like his father had gotten the car ready for [them]."" The
representatives then took the car and drove it to their office.76
The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that because the creditor's representa-
tives had entered his property and taken the car from his driveway, the reposses-
sion was effected in an oppressive manner which breached the peace." The court
concluded that the repossession had been carried out in a peaceful manner be-
cause there was no objection to the repossession, nor was there any other threat of
impending violence.7 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished
Kirkwood79 in that the representatives never entered or violated the home of the
plaintiff.8" The court further stated that here there was "no proof that the collec-
tor['s] . . . conduct was characterized by oppressiveness, wantonness or mali-
ciousness, or otherwise in wreckless [sic] disregard of the legal rights of the
plaintiff."" Therefore, there was no breach of the peace, and the repossession was
valid. a2
The final case decided before Ivy was Martin v. Cook.83 In this case the plaintiff,
Martin, had purchased a new tractor truck. 84 Even after defaulting on the truck
note, Martin still used the truck to make deliveries .8 He left the truck overnight in
Memphis, Tennessee, to await loading, and then he spent the night away from the
vehicle. 8' During the night, the defendant repossessed the truck.87 In the course of
the repossession, the defendant did not damage the truck, but he did remove an air
vent in order to unlock the truck from the inside.88 The trial court granted a motion
declaring the repossession unlawful as a matter of law. 9
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and
stated that the "repossession was lawful under the terms of the conditional sales
contract, and was not effectuated through any breach of the peace."9" In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned that the right to self-help repossession exists if
the seller can exercise it" 'peaceably, but if the buyer objects and protests against
the seller's retaking the property, and obstructs him in so doing, it is the duty of the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 320.
78. Id.
79. Id. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
80. Dearman v. Williams, 109 So. 2d 316, 320-21 (Miss. 1959).
81. Id. at 321.
82. Id.
83. 114 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1959).
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seller to resort to legal process to enforce his right to repossession.' "91 The court
stated, however, that Cook's actions in repossessing the truck did not create a
breach of the peace because they did not involve violence or constitute unlawful
force since no damage was done to the vehicle.92
2. Federal Court Decision
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals added to the breach of the peace menagerie
in Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 3 There, the plaintiff, Butler, alleged that Ford
Motor Credit Company [hereinafter FMCC] illegally repossessed his truck after
he defaulted on his loan.94 In carrying out the repossession, the agents of the re-
covery company entered Butler's unenclosed driveway and took possession of the
truck.95 No protest was made to the repossession.9
Butler claimed that the entering of his land constituted a trespass and thus a
breach of the peace. 7 He contended that Mississippi law, which holds no breach of
the peace for entering an unenclosed driveway,98 could be distinguished by the fact
that those cases involved security contracts with provisions for the entering of land
to take possession. 9 Butler's argument centered on the theory that since he had not
contractually granted the privilege of entry to FMCC for the purpose of self-help
repossession, this trespass was a breach of the peace.'
Noting that the Mississippi Supreme Court had not decided a case with similar
facts, the Fifth Circuit held that the Mississippi cases and the decisions of other
jurisdictions showed that" 'the repossession of an automobile from a driveway or a
public street (absent other circumstances, such as the debtor's objection) [will not]
constitute[ ] a breach of the peace."'10" Therefore, no contractual agreement was
necessary to grant the creditor the right to enter the property for the purpose of
exercising self-help repossession, and because FMCC had peacefully executed
this repossession, the court declared it valid.
10 2
91. Id. (quoting R.P.D., Annotation, LiabilityforAssault or Trespass in Forcibly Retaking Property Sold Condi-
tionally, 105 A.L.R. 926, 926 (1936)).
92. Id.
93. 829 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1987). The case was removed by Ford Motor Credit Company from the state court





98. See Dearman v. Williams, 109 So. 2d 316 (Miss. 1959); supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
99. Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1987).
tOO. Id.
101. Id. at 570 (quoting JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1097 (2d ed. 1980)).
102. Id. It can be assumed that by citing Butler, the Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted this view.
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P. Other Views on the Breach of the Peace Exception
Although Mississippi does not have a case similar to Ivy, other jurisdictions
have heard analogous cases. In Jordan v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, °3 the
South Carolina Supreme Court decided a case which is factually similar to the in-
stant case. In Jordan, the recovery agent repossessed a truck from Jordan's yard. 104
The keys were in the truck, so the agent cranked it and drove it away. 15 The plain-
tiff heard the motor running, saw the truck being driven away, and, thinking that
the truck was being stolen, chased it in another vehicle for several miles. 106 During
this chase, the agent violated traffic laws by driving carelessly and running stop
lights. 107
In determining that there was no breach of the peace, the court looked not to the
question of whether a breach of the peace occurred, but rather when the alleged
violations occurred. 108 The court stated:
We are not at all sure that the alleged violations of the traffic laws amounted to a
breach of the peace, but even if it be assumed that they did, the conduct was not inci-
dent to seizing the truck at the residence of the Appellants [Jordan]. The breach of
the peace as contemplated by the statute and our cases refers to conduct at or near
and/or incident to the seizure of the property. 1
09
Because the alleged breach of the peace did not happen at the time of the reposses-
sion, the court held that it was not a breach of the peace as contemplated by the
U.C.C."0 Thus, regardless of whether the traffic violations were found to be a
breach of the peace, the repossession was valid."1
The federal district court in Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp. 2 also addressed a
case similar to Ivy. In Wallace, the defendant retained Ralph King, an off-duty
deputy sheriff, to repossess Wallace's truck."'3 During the early morning hours,
when the truck was parked in a hotel lot, King entered the truck, revved the en-
gine, and "'barrell[ed] . . .down the street.' ""4 After a brief chase, Wallace fi-
nally caught up with King, who threatened Wallace with imprisonment if he did
not desist in his objection to the repossession. 15 Wallace claimed that the peace
was breached when he was threatened with imprisonment and when King drove
103. 298 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1982).





109. Id. at 214.
110.Id.
111. Id.
112. 743 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. Va. 1990).
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wildly down the street. 116 He argued that since the repossession had been effected
in the face of a breach of the peace, it was illegal. 1 '
The court, however, found that no breach of the peace occurred during the re-
possession.118 The court determined that the revving of an engine and careless
driving is "not an incitement to violence or to break the peace." 19 The court also
ruled that threatening actions, such as King's threat of imprisonment, would ordi-
narily be a breach of the peace, but here they could not serve to invalidate the re-
possession because they were not closely related in time to the repossession.120
These threats were made after King "had obtained dominion over the truck, and
therefore they could not be the basis for finding that breach of the peace occurred
during the repossession." 21
The significance of requiring that the breach of the peace be closely related in
time to the repossession is perfectly demonstrated by Wade v. Ford Motor Credit
Co. 122 In Wade, the defendant sent a representative to the plaintiffs home to repos-
sess a car from her driveway. 123 During his attempt to repossess the car, he noticed
a serial number discrepancy between the car and his records. 124 When he got out
of the car to investigate the discrepancy, the plaintiff orally objected to the repos-
session, and the representative left without incident.
1 25
About a month later, the representative returned to repossess the car. 126 This
time he came at 2:00 a.m., started the car with a key, and drove the car away with-
out incident. 127 The noise of the repossession woke the plaintiff, but she did not
confront the representative or make known an objection. 
128
On review, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that
there had been no breach of the peace. 129 The court stated that during the first re-
possession attempt a breach of the peace had interrupted the repossession, but ac-
knowledged that it was a different question as to whether this breach also voided
the actual repossession over a month later.130 The actual repossession was effectu-
ated without a breach of the peace; thus, in order for it to be voided, the breach of
the peace caused during the first attempt would have to carry over until the actual
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1232-33.
118. Id. at 1233.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1233-34.
122. 668 P.2d 183 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).
123. Id. at 184.
124. Id.
125. Id. The plaintiffs objection consisted of telling the representative that she had a gun and that she would
leave any future repossessor "laying right where [she] saw [him]." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court held that the noise of the repossession, even though it woke the plaintiff, was not enough to
cause a breach of the peace. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 189.
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repossession. 131 The court held that the passage of time between the first attempt
and actual repossession substantially reduced the likelihood of violence and did
not allow the breach to carry over. 2 The court also reaffirmed that the purpose of
the U. C. C. was the prevention of violence, 3 3 and since the second attempt at "re-
possession was effected without incident" of violence, either threatened or real,
there was no breach of the peace, and the repossession did not violate the spirit or
purpose of the U.C.C."'34
IV. INSTANT CASE
Lester Ivy first brought suit in the Circuit Court of Smith County alleging that
GMAC used improper repossession methods in dealing with him.135 He claimed
that in repossessing his van, GMAC breached the peace by carrying out the repos-
session in a warrantless and malicious manner.3 6 The jury agreed and awarded
actual and punitive damages, although the judge granted a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict against the award of punitive damages .13 Ivy then appealed
the judge's ruling to the Mississippi Supreme Court.13
On cross-appeal, GMAC argued that the jury erred in finding that a breach of
the peace occurred. 3' GMAC contended that a breach of the peace did not occur
at or near the incident of the repossession, and thus that the repossession was
valid. 4 GMAC relied on Jordan v. Citizens & Southern National Bank 4 , for this
proposition, and while conceding that a wreck had occurred, it argued that be-
cause of the distance and time from the incident of the repossession the wreck
should not serve to invalidate the repossession.' 42
Ivy, of course, disagreed and characterized GMAC's argument as "spread[ing]
the gloss on the facts extra thick."1" He stated that the heart of GMAC's claim was
the premise that the repossession ends with the hitching and towing away of the
vehicle.'" Ivy contended that Mississippi law does not state when the repossession
ends, and since this wreck happened as Freeman and Baker were driving away
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 187.
134. Id. at 189.




139. Id. at 111 I. GMAC also raised four other issues on cross-appeal. Id. It argued (1) that the trial judge erred
by not striking prospective jurors; (2) that the trial judge abused his discretion by overruling GMAC's motion in
limine as to the word replevin; (3) whether punitive damages were properly ruled on; and (4) whether Ivy prop-
erly perfected his appeal from the circuit court. Id. As the purpose of this Note is to focus on what constitutes a
breach of the peace, these other issues will not be addressed.
140. Brief for Appellee at 9, Ivy v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108 (Miss. 1992) (No. 89-CA-
1359).
141. 298 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1982). See also supra notes 104-12.
142. Brief for Appellee at 9, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359).
143. Appellant's Rebuttal Brief at 1, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359).
144. Id.
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from the repossession, it was causally related and thus incident to the reposses-
sion. 14 Therefore, Ivy argued that even under the rationale of Jordan this repos-
session was invalid. 1"
The court set the tone of the opinion in the first paragraph when it described
self-help repossession as one that is "still allowed under Mississippi law."147 After
admitting that this case was a hard decision, the court set out the test that would be
used in determining a breach of the peace.48It stated:
"Since physical violence will ordinarily result in a breach of peace, the secured
party's right to repossession will end if repossession evokes physical violence, either
on the part of the debtor or the secured party. At the other extreme from physical
violence, a secured party may peaceably persuade the debtor to give up the collateral
so that no breach of peace occurs. Between those two extreme situations -one in
which violence occurs and the other in which the debtor peaceably gives up the col-
lateral - lies the line which divides those cases in which the secured party may exer-
cise self-help repossession and those in which he must resort to the courts. As with
most dividing lines, the line between those two extremes is sometimes hard to locate
and, even if it is located, it sometimes moves.
The opinion was equally elusive in that it never made the court's reasoning
clear. The court never addressed GMAC's main argument and began only by re-
citing previous court decisions on the issue. 150 These cases did not include Jordan,
and of all the cases cited the court never said whether it approved or disapproved
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Ivy v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Miss. 1992).
148. Id. at 1111.
149. Id. at 1112 (quoting HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE SEIEs § 503:03 (1991) (Art. 9)).
150. The court presented a lengthy list of case summaries and their citations. These cases were not only from
Mississippi, but were also from other jurisdictions. The main points are as follows: First, Mississippi law allows
a creditor to enter a private driveway to effectuate a repossession. Ivy, 612 So. 2d at 1111 (citing Dearman v.
Williams, 109 So. 2d 316 (Miss. 1959) (supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text); Martin v. Cook, 114 So. 2d
669 (Miss. 1959) (supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text)).
Also, the mere fact that a debtor has withheld his consent or strongly objected does not necessarily create a
breach of the peace. Id. (citing Furches Motor Co. v. Anderson, 61 So. 2d 674 (Miss. 1952) (supra notes 47-52
and accompanying text); Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, I So. 2d 776 (Miss. 1941) (supra notes 34-46 and
accompanying text)). The court also stated that the use of trickery does not create a breach of the peace. Id. (cit-
ing Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971); Parks v. Associates Commercial
Corp., 351 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Speigle v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 323 So. 2d 360 (Ala. Civ. App.),
cert. denied, 323 So. 2d 367 (Ala. 1975); Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co., 213 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1975)).
Compare with Walker v. Walthall, 588 P.2d 863 (Ariz. 1978) (taking an off-duty deputy sheriff, who is in full
uniform, along when you effectuate the repossession is a breach of the peace even if there is no violence nor threat
of violence).
Fourth, the court stated "that a debtor's 'physical objection'-'even from a public street'-bars repossession."
Ivy, 612 So. 2d at 1112 (quoting Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977)). Next, the court stated that when a creditor uses profanity to speak harshly to the debtor, and the debtor
has objected to the repossession, thena breach of the peace occurs. Id. (citing Deavers v. Standridge, 242 S.E.2d
331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)).
Finally, the court stated "that the use of intimidation or acts 'fraught with the likelihood of violence' constitutes
a breach of peace." Id. (quoting Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 254 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio 1970)). It is inter-
esting to note that the court offered Kirkwood v. Hickman, a Mississippi case, only to be accorded with Morris.
See Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1955); supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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of these cases, or whether they were distinguishable from Ivy. 1 The court merely
summarized its holding by stating that "[a]pplication of the foregoing principles to
the evidence. . . leads this Court to conclude that a breach of peace did occur."152
V. ANALYSIS
U. C. C. section 9-503 is designed to prevent the eruption of violence over a dis-
puted repossession. The words "breach of the peace," as used in the statute, have
been broadly defined as a variance of the criminal law definition. 5 3 The criminal
law defines breach of the peace as "'a violation of public order, a disturbance of the
public tranquility, by an act or conduct inciting to violence.' "'I Over the years,
courts have added to this definition, and since the U. C. C. did not redefine breach
of the peace, the pre-U. C. C. definitions remain valid in this context."55
The definition has evolved into a doctrine that recognizes two practical consid-
erations: the traditional sanctity of the home and the need for a ban on the use of
force. The definition then incorporates these considerations into the goal of pre-
venting violence. First, the U.C.C., particularly as interpreted by the Mississippi
Supreme Court, recognizes the sanctity of the home." 6 Building on the decisions
in Kirkwood 7 and Dearman,5 8 the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that a
repossessor should not "invade the privacy of the plaintiffs home."5 9 At the same
time, however, the court has recognized the right of the creditor to peacefully en-
ter onto the debtor's land to effectuate a repossession. *10 This distinction clearly
shows that the controlling factor is the violation of the actual dwelling. If the inter-
est to be protected is the sanctity of the homestead, as opposed to the sanctity of
the dwelling, then actions such as entering an unenclosed structure, which is
clearly legal, 61 would also be illegal acts. But, since they are not, we can assume
that so long as peaceful repossession does not involve forced entry into a dwelling,
it will be legal.
Second, the definition also recognizes that in order for peaceful self-help repos-
sessions to be a reality, the use of force must not be allowed. The prior cases
clearly show that use of force will not be tolerated in repossession of chattels from
151. Ivy, 612 So. 2d at 1112.
152. Id.
153. Sam O. Simmerman & John Variola, Note, Is Repossession Accomplished by the Use of Stealth, Trickery, or
Frauda Breach of the Peace Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-503?, 40 OH0O ST. L.J. 501,502 (1979).
154. Id. (quoting 2 R. ANDERSON, WHAerON'S CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 802 (1957)).
155. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 27-6.
156. Dearman v. Williams, 109 So. 2d 316, 320 (Miss. 1959).
157. Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1955).
158. Dearman, 109 So. 2d 316.
159. Id. at 321.
160. Id. See also Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Mississippi law).
161. "[Tihis Court has held that entering a private driveway to repossess collateral without use of force does not
constitute a breach of peace." Ivy v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108, 1111 (1992). See also
Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (entering unenclosed carport
was not a breach of the peace).
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private individuals. 162 A case such as Spence163 demonstrates that the court will
not tolerate the breaking of a car window, even though this act in no way incited
immediate violence, nor created a situation in which violence from a third party
would be encouraged." Although in Martin the court did allow for the physical
intrusion into an abandoned vehicle,16 this variance in analyses can be accounted
for by the fact that the forced entry in Martin only involved the temporary altera-
tion of the vehicle and did not involve actual damage to the vehicle.
Thus, the pre-Ivy law presented a well-balanced view of the breach of the peace
exception to the right of self-help repossession. Early on in its jurisprudence on the
subject, the Mississippi Supreme Court showed its recognition of this delicate bal-
ance when it stated that it had reduced the right to self-help repossession "as much
as the law. . . will allow, and [that the court could not] impose further limitations
upon it. ' 166 These rulings presented a practical approach to breach of the peace
which respected the intent of the U.C.C. by recognizing that no repossession
could occur in the face of a breach of the peace, nor could fear of violence allow
the right to self-help repossession to be eroded into non-existence. 1 67 This recogni-
tion is particularly illustrated by cases such as Cain, 168 where the court recognized
that even if the repossession is not conceded, it is still valid if it did not evoke vio-
lence or the threat of violence.' 69
The court's decision in Ivy, however, marks a divergence from this pattern and
is analytically flawed in two important respects. These flaws serve to confuse the
definition of the breach of the peace exception and skew its interpretation toward
the view of the debtor. The first instance of flawed reasoning is the fact that
Mississippi law does not differentiate between a breach of the peace that occurs at
or incident to the repossession and one that occurs after the repossessor has com-
pletely gained dominion over the chattel. Other courts have dealt with this issue
and determined that some differentiation is required and have drawn a line at
which point a breach of the peace no longer affects the repossession. 170
In Ivy the fact that a collision occurred between Ivy and Freeman and Baker is
not disputed.171 The dispute is whether or not this collision occurred such as to be
a breach of the peace under the U.C.C. and thus invalidate the repossession.
GMAC argued that "f[at the time the van was taken, there was no incident which
162. "[I]n repossessions of a commercial collateral, the courts are less protective of the debtor." Barkley Clark,
Survey: Uniform Commercial Code, 43 Bus. LAw. 1425 (1988).
163. Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 184 So. 439 (Miss. 1938). See also supra notes 24-33 and accompany-
ing text.
164. Spence, 184 So. at 441.
165. Martin v. Cook, 114 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1959).
166. Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, 1 So. 2d 776, 778 (Miss. 1941).
167. See generally Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 92 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1957) (lying to child is not a
breach of the peace unless accompanied by force or violence); Cain, 1 So. 2d 776 (oral objection is not a breach
of the peace unless it causes violence).
168. Cain, I So. 2d 776.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
171. Ivy v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Miss. 1992).
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might have provoked violence between the two parties."172 Thus, regardless of
whether or not the wreck constituted a breach of the peace, it should not serve to
invalidate the repossession.
The position taken by GMAC is a better resolution to the question of whether a
breach of the peace must be incident to the repossession, because this position al-
lows for more balance between the rights of the creditor and those of the debtor.
The rule in Ivy means that if there is any chance that a repossession will evoke a
breach of the peace at any time, then the repossessor must resort to the courts. Un-
der the view proposed by GMAC, unlike the Ivy rule, the creditors would be re-
sponsible only for ensuring that they could seize and gain dominion over the
chattel without a breach of the peace.
This position should not be offensive to the rights of the debtor. Other courts
have shown sensitivity to this distinction. In Wallace, 7' which involved near-
physical violence, the court was dealing with a breach of the peace at least as egre-
gious as the one in Ivy. Yet the Wallace Court recognized the problems that could
be created by the absence of a requirement that the breach be at or near the inci-
dent of the repossession, and accordingly drew the line between breaches that do
and do not invalidate a repossession under the U.C.C.
If a rule with a requirement that the breach be at or near the incident of the re-
possession had been applied in Ivy, then there would have been no breach of the
peace. According to the court, the breach of the peace occurred with the collision
of Ivy's pickup truck and the tow truck. 7 This breach of the peace occurred over a
mile away from the actual taking and thus is not at or incident to the repossession.
Further, at this point Mr. Ivy had become the aggressor and was seeking to recap-
ture his van. The van had been removed some distance from his property, and it
had otherwise been a peaceful repossession. This lapse in time between the repos-
session and the breach of the peace indicates that the breach was not incident to the
repossession but rather incident to Mr. Ivy's acts, which compose an entirely dif-
ferent claim. Thus, the lapse in time should have diminished the likelihood of vio-
lence and fulfilled the purpose of the U.C.C.
The Ivy rule would be more complete if the court had included some type of
time requirement. As the rule stands now, it is not clear when the breach of the
peace must occur in order to deem the repossession invalid. This creates an anom-
aly in the law in that it shifts the incentive from encouraging creditors to resort to
the courts to encouraging the debtor to incite violence as soon as he realizes that
the repossession has been perfected. Under the Ivy rule, if a debtor realizes that
his vehicle has been repossessed, but the repossessor has gotten away so that a
protest would be ineffective, it would be easy for the debtor to take actions similar
to Mr. Ivy's, with similar results.
172. Brief for Appellee at 9, Ivy (No. 89-CA- 1359).
173. 743 F Supp. 1228 (W.D. Va. 1990).
174. Brief for Appellee at 9, Ivy (No. 89-CA-1359).
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The Ivy rule also creates a slight disparity with tort law rulings on defense of
property. Even if Mr. Ivy's actions are viewed strictly in the light of his impres-
sions on the morning of the repossession,17 then his actions still would not be
proper. Tort law provides that a chattel holder can use self-help to resist the dispos-
session of his property.176 While this privilege refers to the right to prevent a dis-
possession, the law has created an exception to allow the owner to attempt to
recapture his chattel provided there is only a momentary lapse of possession. 177
While modern precedent is lacking, it is very probable that Mr. Ivy's actions
would have been allowable if the van had been stolen. But, this privilege does not
exist if the chattel is properly taken,' 78 and Mr. Ivy would bear the responsibility
for being correct about the lawfulness of the taking.179 Since there is no indication
from the facts presented by the court that this repossession was unlawful before
the collision, up to that point it was a lawful taking. Therefore, Mr. Ivy was al-
lowed to create a breach of the peace (which then invalidated the repossession) re-
gardless of the legality of the original dispossession. This is a privilege clearly not
allowed by the defense of property doctrine. Thus, this disparity in the body of law
creates a situation where someone in Mr. Ivy's position could not know his legal
rights or duties in reacting to a similar situation.
The second instance of flawed reasoning is the lack of a requirement that the
creditor have reasonable notice that the debtor has objected to the repossession. In
Ivy, the breach of the peace occurred with the collision, but nowhere in the opin-
ion is it asserted that Freeman and Baker knew they were being chased.18 They
had no reason to realize that the repossession was contested, nor that their duty to
cease the repossession had been triggered. As far as can be ascertained, Freeman
and Baker thought they had made a clean repossession, yet they were still held re-
sponsible for the breach of the peace.
This creates a situation where creditors will find it very difficult to carry out
self-help repossession. Even if the creditors are able to seize dominion of the chat-
tel without a breach of the peace, this does not guarantee a successful reposses-
sion. Unless the repossession was carried out at a time when there was no one else
around, it would be very possible that a protest would be made at some point dur-
ing the repossession. Ivy clearly holds the creditor responsible for a breach of the
peace, even though he may not be aware of its existence. Thus, in order for a cred-
itor to safely attempt a repossession, he must make absolutely certain that he will
not only be able to gain dominion over the chattel, but because Mississippi has not
175. Mr. Ivy claimed that the repossessors saw him and knew that the repossession was being protested. This is
apparently why he was convinced that the van was being stolen and that he should chase down the tow truck to
recover his van.
176. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TOrs § 21 (5th ed. 1984).
177. Id. § 22.
178. Id. §21.
179. Id. § 22.
180. The court does mention in a footnote that "Ivy testified that ... Freeman 'swerved to the left' in order 'to
block' him from passing." Ivy v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108, 1110 n.4 (Miss. 1992) (em-
phasis added). This, however, does not indicate that Freeman and Baker knew they were being chased.
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drawn the line as to when the breach of the peace must occur, as related to the re-
possession, then he must also be able to at all times avoid any breach of the peace
that might be created with or without his knowledge.
Mississippi's new pro-debtor view of the breach of the peace exception to the
right of self-help repossession is not without serious consequences. The most seri-
ous of these is that Ivy will, ironically, promote violence. Given the lack of a time
requirement and the lack of a requirement that the creditor reasonably be aware of
any objections to the repossession, the debtor is now encouraged to create a breach
of the peace in order to invalidate the repossession. The situation can easily be
imagined where a debtor discovers that his chattel has been repossessed in an oth-
erwise legal fashion. He then chases the repossessor, pulls him over, and threatens
him with physical violence in order to regain possession of his chattel. This is a
breach of the peace clearly caused by the debtor, yet under Ivy it would be an in-
valid repossession and the fault would fall to the creditor for "taking the law into
[his] own hands" by carrying out the self-help repossession.181
Again, a rule such as applied in Jordan and Wallace would make a more sensible
ruling. Using that rule, this scenario would be removed from the repossession and
would not invalidate the repossession. Under that type of rule, the court would
recognize that the time lapse between the taking and the incident of violence pro-
vided a sufficient attentuation so as to allow the repossession to remain valid, and
the debtor would be held responsible for this act of violence.
Finally, the Ivy rule will also increase the cost of credit. The court asserted that
it was unreasonable for GMAC to carry out this repossession when they had the
option of replevin,182 but replevin entails costs, including attorney's fees, court
costs, and other expenses of court action. 1 This increased price of credit will be
passed on to the consumer, because competition and usury laws will usually pre-
vent the creditor from raising the interest rate exorbitantly high. 84 Thus, the logi-
cal remedy for the creditor is to deny credit to the higher risk groups, which are
usually the lower income groups, or to raise the required down payment. 185 While
these acts can have the positive effect of reducing the rate of default, they also
make goods less affordable, and thus less available for lower income groups.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ivy represents a distinct redefinition of the breach of the peace exception to the
right of self-help repossession. In Ivy, the court tipped the delicate balance be-
tween the rights of the creditor and the rights of the debtor decisively toward the
debtor, and thus created a situation where the statutory right of self-help reposses-
sion is very difficult to utilize.
181. Id. at 1120 (McRae, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
182. Id.
183. White, supra note 1, at 515-16.
184. White, supra note 1, at 522.
185. White, supra note 1, at 522.
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U.C.C. section 9-503 was drafted to provide the right to self-help reposses-
sions while still maintaining this delicate balance of rights. The Ivy decision, how-
ever, not only created anomalies and discrepancies within the body of law as a
whole, but it circumvented the purpose of the U. C. C. by putting self-help repos-
sessions in the realm of extraordinary remedies. While this may be the effect that
the court was looking for, its wisdom must be questioned. Self-help repossession
is a right that cannot easily be replaced by the action of replevin, and the demise of
self-help repossession has serious consequences.
Ivy has, however, successfully reiterated the need for the avoidance of a breach
of the peace during a self-help repossession. Perhaps future cases will benefit all
of society by being equally successful at reiterating the rights of the creditor and
thus reestablishing the delicate balance between these two sets of rights. 86
186. An interesting twist in the self-help repossession drama has recently been added by the court. In Hester v.
Bandy, 627 So. 2d 833 (Miss. 1993), the court heard the arguments of plaintiffs who had fallen two months be-
hind on their truck payments. Id. at 836. At 3:00 a.m., the representatives of a repossession company, which was
hired by the defendant, entered the plaintiff's property and moved the plaintiff's other car in order to repossess
the truck. Id. After the representatives attached a "quick snatch harness" and began to drive away, the plaintiff
came running out of the house yelling for the representatives to stop. Id. While running, he fell into a ditch and
hurt his shoulder and knee. Id. at 835. The court determined that a breach of the peace did occur and invalidated
the repossession. Id. at 840.
Hester is interesting in several regards. Under the analysis suggested by this Note, the case was decided cor-
rectly. The fact that the plaintiff was chasing after the repossessors while they were still on his property clearly
shows an objection on the part of the plaintiff incident to the repossession, and likely to incite violence. The lan-
guage the court used, however, is not limiting of Ivy. In fact, the majority stated that "[i]t is generally held that
U.C.C. 9-503 does not authorize the secured party to repossess the collateral. . . over the protest of the debtor
owner." Hester, 627 So. 2d at 841. This is in contradiction of Commercial Credit Co. v. Cain, I So. 2d 776
(Miss. 1941), where the court held that a debtor's objection will not invalidate the repossession unless it is likely
to incite violence. Id. at 778. In Hester, the court further stated that the statute gives the secured party the right to
enter the premises of the debtor to effect the repossession. Hester, 627 So. 2d at 840. But, according to the court,
"[tihis. . . is the limit of the right to repossess without instituting legal action." Id.
Thus, Hesterpresented Ivy's first test. The Hester Court applied Ivy in such a manner as to not affect the contro-
versial sections of the Ivy decision. Hope for a decision which counters Ivy, and reestablishes the balance of
rights, seems to be waning.
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